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RECENT BOOKS
This department undertakes to note or review briefly current books on law and matters
closely related thereto. Periodicals, court reports, and other publications that appear at
frequent intervals are not included. The information given in the notes is derived from
inspection of the books, publishers' literature, and the ordinary library sources.

BRIEF REVIEWS
THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM. By Eleanor Bontecou. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 377. $5.
The Supreme Court has found in the phrase "ordered liberty"1 a ready
touchstone for the constitutional standards of due process. But the words
"ordered liberty" may also serve to pinpoint the central problem of all free
society: the problem of harmonizing the seeming clash between the demands of
individual liberty and the requirements of public order. One of today's most
compelling examples of the difficulty of reconciling this apparent conflict of
interests receives an exhaustive study in Miss Bontecou's volume on the origin
and functioning of the federal loyalty program under President T roman. Her
work has lost little of its relevance as a result of the changes introduced by
President Eisenhower's security program. For quite apart from the fact that
those changes may be more a matter of form than of substance,2 the present
study provides a case-illustrated analysis of the philosophy which must underlie
any federal scheme affecting government security and employee freedom.
After a brief survey of the security measures adopted during the World Wars
and the events leading up to the inauguration of the loyalty program in 1947,
Miss Bontecou undertakes a long and detailed examination of the investigative
and adjudicative operations under the President's Loyalty Order. Consideration
of the program as a whole is supplemented by frequent reference to the concrete
problems posed by eighty-five cases studied by the author.
Under the loyalty-security program two types of cases arose, which theoretically at least were quite distinct: (I) security cases, handled under summary
dismissal statutes covering certain individual departments, etc., and (2) loyalty
cases, handled under an Executive Order covering the entire government. (It
was over the latter category that the now defunct Loyalty Review Board had the
power of final review.) Employees in positions classified as "sensitive" were
subject to dismissal on the ground that they were "security risks," i.e., that they
"might voluntarily or involuntarily act against the security interests of the United
States."
adverse security judgment carried no moral stigma and would not

A:n

l "[Certain] immunities ..• have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty••••" Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court in Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 at 324-325, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
2 See Bontecou, ''President Eisenhower's 'Security' Program," 9 BtJL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 215 (1953). A more informal account of the new Eisenhower program will be found
in ''The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington,'' 193 ATLANTIC MONTHLY
16 (April 1954).
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preclude employment in other nonsensitive government positions. On the other
hand, the question of an employee's ''loyalty" went to the matter of intent. A
discharge on the basis of disloyalty involved a finding that the employee owed
allegiance to a foreign idea of government which would prevent loyal service
to the United States. Such was the theory. In practice, the line of demarcation
between the two classes of cases was often blurred, and on occasion the concept
of disloyalty was enlarged almost beyond recognition. Thus one employee may
have been adjudged disloyal, not because he personally adhered to Communist
ideology but because it was thought that he might "go too far in upholding the
right of Communists to spread their own doctrines" (pp. 69-70). An accused
employee's chances of clearing himself were further limited when the standard
of proof in loyalty cases was changed from "reasonable grounds for belief that
the person involved is disloyal" to "reasonable doubt as to loyalty." In view of
all this it might indeed be questioned how much of a real change was made
when the loyalty program as such was abolished by President Eisenhower and
the supposedly broader security test applied to all government positions.
Miss Bontecou could discover no cases dealt with under the Loyalty Order
which involved treason, sedition, espionage, sabotage, or advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force or violence. Instead, disloyalty came to mean
simply Communism. The most common charge was association with individuals who were said to be subversive or connected with organizations listed by
the Attorney General. Despite this narrowing of the issue, however, it was hard
to prove Communist sympathies by documentary evidence or direct testimony.
This led to the use in loyalty hearings of the statements of confidential witnesses
and unidentified informants and the consideration of "indicia of communism,"
which could mean anything from an employee's attitude toward the Negro to his
interest in the Ballet Russe. There seems to be considerable support for the
author's conclusion that such methods are unduly costly in terms of time, money,
and employee morale, and that the fear and suspicion engendered by them could
conceivably leave us with a government of "loyal numskulls."
A provocative chapter on the Attorney General's list points up the dangers
of affixing guilt by association. Intensive study of several organizations branded
as Communist reveals that some were completely innocent in their origin and
were only subsequently captured by Communist infiltration, while others found
their major appeal in providing such purely economic benefits as low-cost insurance. Consequently, proper evaluation of the effect to be given evidence of
membership in such groups requires a keen a'Y"areness of the whole history of
each organization. Theoretically, of course, membership was always treated
as only one piece of evidence indicating disloyalty. Nevertheless, the author
believes, the sweeping use made of the Attorney General's list by loyalty boards,
the stiff task faced by anyone attempting to refute charges based upon membership in proscribed groups, and the irreparable harm which might be done individual members cast grave doubt on the wisdom and legality of listing organizations without notice, hearing, or disclosure of the facts supporting proscription.
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Of particular interest to lawyers is the section on "The Loyalty-Security
Program and Legal Tradition." This is a bird's-eye view of a complex picture
and lays no claim to being definitive. illustrative of the analytical problems is
Miss Bontecou's earnest but not quite successful effort to bring order out of the
chaos of such a case as Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. 3
There, five Supreme Court justices, in separate concurring opinions, utilized
at least four different theories to strike down the Attorney General's fiat listing
of certain organizations as Communist, when on the face of the record they were
engaged solely in charitable or insurance activities. H this chapter served no other
purpose, however, it would still be well worth-while for its puncturing of the
cliche, "Goverment employment is a privilege and not a right."
For comparison purposes, there is added a postscript on the English security
program. The English system apparently provides inferior procedural safeguards.
But at the same time the inquiry is narrowly confined to security issues, and the
program aims only at the removal from certain sensitive government posts of
employees so closely associated with the Communist Party as to be unreliable.
The crucial importance of the caliber of the persons enforcing security measures
under any plan is underscored in the observation that the men primarily responsible for the success of the British program "have sufficient imagination and
sophistication to understand th.at the idealism which may lead young men to
espouse radical causes in their youth is a valuable quality in a civil servant"
(p. 268).
The author's conclusions are temperate. For the most part, she believes the
Truman loyalty program was handled with a genuine determination to be fair
to government employees. But she nevertheless finds that there were too many
failings in the system as a result of elusive standards of judgment, unwise and
clumsy administration, and unnecessary concealment of sources of information.
She particularly suggests that a "standard of judgment could be evolved that
would be clearly limited to the specific dangers which must be met" (p. 242).
The English standard is recommended as a working model, though it is admitted
that the present mood of American public opinion would probably not stand for
a program quite so restricted as the British.
The Federal Loyalty-Security Program is one of a series made possible by a
grant to Cornell University from the Rockefeller Foundation for the purpose of
studying the impact of government loyalty programs on civil liberties. Miss
Bontecou, a lawyer with experience in the federal service, performs ·her part of
this task with thorough scholarship and real restraint. Nonetheless, it must be
said that the very terms of the Rockefeller grant may set the focus of the study
off-center. Miss -Bontecou herself suggests, in a:µother context, that employee
freedom and national security are in reality but different aspects of the larger
problem of-national security; if this is so, a distorted image will necessarily result
when all attention is concentrated upon only one aspect of the problem-as this
a 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951).
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book admittedly concentrates on the aspect of employee freedom. This is not
meant as a condemnation but as a caveat; obviously, adequate coverage of the
whole program cannot be given in one volume. On the particular aspect she has
chosen to treat Miss Bontecou undoubtedly sheds much valuable light, and her
dispassionate presentation reveals the poised mind needed for dealing with so
delicate a subject. Even so, the caveat must stand. For "ordered liberty" loses
its meaning if we slight either the noun or the adjective.

Theodore J. St. Antoine, S.Ed.

